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Abstract 
In this paper we empirically discuss whether or not external debt affects country’s governance. 
Indeed, indebted countries need some political governance reforms in order to send out a positive 
signal to international financial community and investors; and so improving business climate. 
However, external debt reduces their flexibility and ability to address associated costs to political 
governance. Our study focuses on the period 1985-2011 and spans 103 developing countries. To deal 
with endogeneity issue, we first lag external debt by one year and second propose two-step tobit 
estimator by instrumenting external debt-to-GDP ratio with real effective exchange rate. Even 
controlling for various conventional determinants of democratic transitions, we find that external 
debt constraints indebted countries to move up democracy scale but incite governments to improve 
investment profile and therefore improving business climate. Furthermore, Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative and International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs dampen the negative 
effect of debt on democratic transitions.  
 
Key words: external debt, governance, democracy, democratic transitions, crisis, investment. 
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1-Introduction 
There is vast literature focused on determinants of democracy (Lipset, 1959, 1993; Tocqueville, 1835; 
Przeworski and al., 1996; John Stephens 1993; Weber, 1906, 1949; Huntington, 1991; Barro, 1999). 
The main determinants largely discussed are: wealth, economic development, urbanization, culture 
(Protestant, Catholic, Islam, etc). Huntington (1991) summarized these preconditions by arguing that 
the emergence of democracy in a society is helped by a number of factors: higher levels of economic 
well-being; the absence of extreme inequalities in wealth and income; greater social pluralism, 
including particularly a strong and autonomous bourgeoisie; a more market-oriented economy; 
greater influence vis-à-vis the society of existing democracy states; and a culture that is less monistic 
and more tolerant of diversity and compromise. The latest determinant discussed is the role of 
capitalism in democracy (Lipset, 1994; John Stephens 1993). For instance, Schumpeter (1950) held 
that “modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process. Furthermore, Waisman (1992), 
seeking to explain why some capitalist societies, particularly in Latin America, have not been 
democratic, has suggested that private ownership of the means of production is not enough to foster 
democracy.  
However, some criticisms rose up against these ideas of preconditions or requisites.  Indeed, Lipset 
(1959) argued that the conflicts among political philosophers about the necessary conditions 
underlying given political systems often lead to a triumphant demonstration that a given situation 
clearly violates the thesis of one’s opponent (Lipset, 1959). Max Weber (quoted by Lipset) also 
argued that differences in national patterns often reflect key historical events which set one process 
in motion in one country, and a second process in another. Furthermore, the strongest criticism 
came from Dankwart Rustow (1970). Indeed, he criticized studies that focused on “preconditions” for 
democratization because they often tended to jump from the correlation between democracy and 
other factors to the conclusion that those other factors were responsible for democracy. In 1984, 
Huntington published a paper where he argued that Rustow’s criticisms were well taken and helped 
to provide a more balanced view of the complexities of democratization (Huntington, 84). From 
there, researchers took into account the complexity of democracy process and sought to understand 
democratic transitions. Karl (1990) contented that “rather than engage in a futile search for new 
preconditions, it is important to clarify how the mode of regime transition […] sets the context within 
which strategic interactions can take place because these interactions, in turn, help to determine 
whether political democracy will emerge and survive”. 
 Since then, many studies focused on democratic transitions in the 1990s, also characterized by 
economic crisis. The Historian Huntington (1991) argued that democratic transitions of 1980s and 
1990s constitute the “third wave” of democratization in the history of the modern world. The first 
“long” wave of democratization began in the 1820s and continued for almost a century until 1926. 
The second occurred after the World War II and reached its zenith in 1962 with 36 countries 
governed democratically. Between 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries made transitions to 
democracy, just about doubling the number of democratic governments in the world. However, it is 
worth noting that in many countries during the 1980s and early 1990s, political democratization 
occurred at the same time as a profound economic crisis (Lipset, 1993; Huntington 1991). Thus, 
economic crisis facilitated political democratization in developing countries because poor economic 
performance reduces the bargaining power of authoritarian incumbents and increases the strength 
of oppositions (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997).  
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Haggard and Kaufman argued that “ it is now impossible to formulate a theory of democratic 
transitions that does not explicitly address the strategic interactions between and within the 
government and opposition. [….]. Such theories require a clear specification of the preferences and 
capabilities of the players and delineation of the agenda over which they are negotiating. […]. The 
opportunity to link the strategic of actors to underlying situational imperatives is foregone.  […..] 
Strategic approaches to transitions pay relatively little attention to economic variables and interests. 
This lacuna partly resulted from timing. Conclusions about the weak causal significance of economic 
factors were reached prior to the crisis of the 1980s, well before the economic fallout of the debt crisis 
could be fully evaluated” (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997: 265).  
In their paper, Haggard and Kaufman focused on how economic conditions influence the timing and 
terms of democratic transitions. Economic crisis undermine the “authoritarian bargains” forged 
between rulers and key sociopolitical constituents and expose rulers to defection from within the 
business sector and protest “from below”. The resulting isolation of incumbent authoritarian leaders 
tends to fragment the ruling elite further and reduce its capacity to negotiate favorable terms of exit.  
However, the two authors failed to considerate explicitly debt as the main leader of democratic 
transitions in developing countries. Indeed, after Mexico’s default in 1982, many countries suffered 
of debt overhang during the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s. As argued by Huntington, 
between 1974 and 1990, democratization accelerated around the world, despite the slowdown of 
global economic growth. If we make comparative study, we remark that those remained 
“authoritarian” until 2011 (for instance Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Emirates Arab, etc) never 
suffered of external debt burden.  There are few authors who have considered the debt as a possible 
source of governance change.  Only Remmer (1990) by studying Latin America countries concluded 
that the debt crisis experienced by these countries is the main cause of governance change.  
However, his paper was based on statistical analysis and does not give a great view on developing 
countries.  This paper aims to consider all developing countries and uses an econometric model to 
explore the impact of external debt on the quality of political governance. Enhancing governance 
quality during debt burden time is necessary, not only to send out positive signals to investors and 
backers, but also to mobilize citizens for debt reimbursement. Indeed, democratic governance 
creates a broad institutional framework that enables market-led economic growth to occur, for 
example, by creating a legal environment conductive to protection of property rights, enforcement 
of contracts, and predictability and stability of policies (Brinkerhoff, 1999). Furthermore, democratic 
governance can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of reform outcomes and results. To that 
end, the synergy arising from partnership and coproduction arrangements can mobilize underutilized 
resource from civil society and the private sector. These arrangements may free public resources 
previously going toward the direct government provision of private goods to reimburse debt. 
Moreover, according to the theory of political legitimacy, tax compliance is positively related to 
perceptions about the government’s trustworthiness (Tayler 2006; Kirchler and al. 2008, Fauvelle-
Aymar 1999).  Thus, giving power and freedom to people can mobilize citizens for debt 
reimbursement by encouraging them to tax compliance. However, this is not something easy. 
Indeed, democratization is associated to high costs that can prevent indebted countries to undertake 
good governance arrangements. As widely shared by researchers, poverty, malnutrition, famine, 
illiteracy and so on fight developing countries. The needs are numerous and developing countries 
have not the necessary financial resource to finance their development. Huntington (1991) argued 
that poverty is a principal-probably the principal obstacle to democratic development. The future of 
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democracy depends on the future of economic development and obstacles to economic 
development are obstacles to the expansion of democracy. Furthermore, Lipset (1993) concluded in 
his paper that efforts to institutionalize freedom in low income countries face severe difficulties 
inherent in the fact that new democratic rights encourage demands and actions that destabilize the 
economy. Thus, external debt can prevent democratic transitions in development countries given 
that they face enormous needs and also democracy is associated to high costs.  
To the best of our knowledge, no study has been done in this approach. On the one hand, the 
indebted countries must improve their institutions in order to enhance business climate and so giving 
a positive signal to investors and international organizations. On the other hand, debt can compel 
these countries in their governance reforms because of associated costs and so having a negative 
effect on the quality of governance.  This paper aims to examine the impact of the external debt on 
the quality of governance in developing countries. It aims to answer the following question: Does the 
external debt lead or prevent countries to undertake governance improvement reforms? 
This paper extends the literature by focusing mainly on the role of external debt on democratic 
transitions. It takes the advantage of using many indicators of democracy and also undertakes an 
important number of robustness exercises. However, in the literature many authors have pointed 
that indebted countries are associated to poor governance (Addison and Rahman 2004; Easterly 
1999). In order to take into account endogeneity issue, we lag external debt variable and therefore 
solves the problem of reverse causality. Furthermore, following Panizza and Presbitero (2012),  we 
propose in last part to address the endogeneity issue by instrumenting the external debt-to-GDP 
ratio with the real effective exchange rate. Indeed, given that external debt is denominated in foreign 
currency, fluctuations of the real effective exchange rate are likely to affect external debt, but not 
directly on democracy scale. 
The study spans 103 developing and transition countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and 
Asia during the period 1985-2011. It bridges the gap between the theories of democratic transitions. 
By adopting the two-steps tobit’s model (Tobit 1958), the results show that external debt constraints 
indebted countries to move up democracy scale but incite governments to improve investment 
profile and therefore improving business climate. Furthermore, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) initiative and International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs dampen the negative effect of debt 
on democratic transitions. The effect of financial and trade openness is mixed.  
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Part 2 begins by sketching the microeconomic theory of 
debt effect on governance. Part 3 presents the data. Part 4 updates the paper with some stylized 
facts. The focus of part 5 is the presentation of the empirical model, which is estimated in part 6. Part 
7 concludes and describes some economic policy recommendations.  
 
2- Theoretical considerations: the microeconomic theory 
The impact of debt on governance has widely developed in firm theory. Generally, the analysis 
focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of debt.  
According to the theory of debt discipline power, the debt compels the leader in his activities. By 
considering an enterprise which is managed by a salary employee and not a shareholder, the theory 
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shows that this situation can create interest conflict between the manager and the shareholders. 
Indeed, the manager would like to increase the perimeter of his actions and carry out some 
investments in order to get prestige and increasing his address book but this policy is limited by the 
level of the enterprise’s debt.  Moreover, the manager cannot borrow indefinitely for increasing the 
investments of the enterprise because not only the investments funded by  loans decrease the 
dividends of the shareholders (interest conflict) but also the manager needs a minimum of liquidity 
to ensure the debt service (Arouri, 2013). The risk is also high for the manager in case of bankruptcy 
of the enterprise. Consequently, we remark that the objective of rooting of the manager by 
investment cannot be hold because of the debt. A suspension of payments results most of the time 
by a change of manager and a loss of specific capital (Gilson, 1989). So, the manager has interest to 
opt for a prudent policy in order to address the different expiry dates (Friend and Lang, 1988).  This 
reasoning can be transposed at macroeconomic level. Indeed, the Head of State has interest to 
increase the investments in order to increase his popularity and his chances to be re-elected in the 
next elections but he is compelled by the debt of the country and the risk of payment’s default he 
has to avoid.  So, the president must make choices in his investment projects, make concessions of 
rights with the population and show oneself indulgent.  
Although debt has some advantages on the quality of governance, it can pose some disadvantages 
which can oppose to the promotion of good governance. Indeed, debt causes a loss of flexibility in 
any policy. If the level of debt is high, there are fixed charges to pay back. Also, there is an 
opportunity cost associated with this situation. The enterprise cannot borrow again in order to 
exploit others opportunities (for instance, adopting new technology, penetrating other markets, 
etc.).  At the macroeconomic level, this loss of flexibility is also obvious. The government cannot 
extend the rights to the population because there are costs associated to the justice, the functioning 
of the State, the remuneration of the Members of Parliament and the respect of order and laws. 
Moreover, debt has agency costs which recover monitoring costs consented by the principal for 
checking the adequacy between the management of the agent and his own objectives and the costs 
engaged by the agent in the aim to reassure the principal about the quality of his management. At 
the macroeconomic level, this is rallied to the loss of autonomy of the State.  Indeed, the loans are 
followed by much conditionality on the management of the loans and the needs of reforms in the 
country. Sometimes, the country can lose the mastery of his policy including the political governance.  
Given that political institutions affect the availability of information in the country and control the 
violations of investment’s contracts, the weight of the government in political reforms is very 
important for the country. If the debt reaches a certain level while the State cannot borrow more in 
order to address the demand of the population, the government has three means: repressing and 
continuing its policy, or going towards more democracy (important political change) or making 
concession (extension of vote rights, freedom of speech, etc.). In certain models, an autocrat could 
voluntarily give up his authority by establishing a constitution, giving power to the legislature, 
increasing voting rights, etc. in order to dissuade the revolution and encourage the private sector. 
Brinkerhoff (1999) shows that sectoral programs and political reforms can contribute to democratic 
governance by creating participation opportunities, transparency and responsibility which transmit 
some signals of wide process of transformation towards more democratic governance.   
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3- Data  
An annual panel dataset consisting of 103 countries from 1985 to 2011 is constructed from a variety 
of sources. Variables of primary interest in the baseline model include the presence of civil liberties 
index, external debt-to-exports ratio, GDP per capita, urbanization rate, labor force and the country 
size, population. In selecting all of these variables, we follow closely the work of previous study 
focusing mainly on democratic transitions.  
 (i) The dependant variable: civil liberties index “Cliberties” 
The variables of political governance are diverse and come from different sources that are generally 
the object of debate about the choice of the appropriated indicator. This divergence comes from the 
definition of political governance, which even if it strives towards a base of freedom, stands out from 
the fundamental elements which must constitute the notion of good governance. Indeed, according 
to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the principles of good governance results in 
some tangible facts like free, fair and regular election, a representative legislature which proposes, 
approves and controls laws and an independent judicial court which interprets the laws. 
Furthermore, the democratic governance exists where the governmental authorities rely on the 
willingness of the people and are responsible for them. According to Lipset (1993), democracy is 
defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the 
governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-
making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to 
influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political 
office. These conditions are more fulfilled but there is no indicator which spans the set of fields that 
emerges from this definition of the UNDP. However, it exists some base elements which are 
summarized on the following definition of the World Bank “the good governance is epitomized by 
predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; 
an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in 
public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law”.  
In this paper, the main chosen indicator is civil liberties of Freedom House. The “Freedom in the 
World” survey provides an annual evaluation of the progress and decline of freedom in 195 countries 
and 14 related and disputed territories. The survey, which includes both analytical reports and 
numerical ratings, measures freedom according to two broad categories: political rights and civil 
liberties. Civil liberties ratings are based on an evaluation of four subcategories: freedom of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy 
and individual rights. Thus, civil liberties refer, for example, to associational and organizational 
freedom, rights to open and lead free discussion, media independence, and protection of the 
political terror or the prevalence of law authority.  
Each country is assigned to a numerical rating from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the most free and 7 
the least free.  Many studies have already used these indicators as measure of the quality of political 
governance: Huntington, 1991, LLSV, 1999; Karatnycky, 2012; Eric Neumayer, 2002; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Robinson, and Yared, 2008. Moreover, this indicator “civil liberties” has the advantage to 
represent an ex ante proxy of the future results of the political negotiation process.  As the investors 
considerate the expected future cash flows and the risks when they are assessing the profitability of 
their investment, this measure is more appropriated. According to North (1990), a good proxy for 
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political institutions might consider the judgments of ex ante restriction of the investors on the 
government behavior rather than the ex-post performance of the government.  
In order to test the robustness of our results, we use the following indicators as governance 
measures: political rights1 “PolRights”, corruption, law and order “LawOrder”, investment profile 
“InvestProfile”. See in appendix for more details.  
 (ii) The independent variables 
External debt in percentage of exports “debtexports”: We use data on external debt reported by 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. External debt has been considered in this 
study, because internal debt could be monetized by the central banks and wouldn’t impact 
significantly the willingness of governments to make some changes of governance. Indeed, the 
leaders of a country can implement a pure and simple cancellation of the internal debt by printing 
banknotes in order to pay back the internal debt. Thus, considering the external debt in percentage 
of export enables to get an idea on the capacity of the country to pay back its debt through the 
exports often depending on the business environment. Moreover, the alert indicators established by 
the IMF and the World Bank in the framework of the HIPC initiative are in percentage of the exports2.  
For the other independent variables, we retain main those described as democracy preconditions: 
GDP per capita: Perhaps the most widespread generalization linking political systems to other 
aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development (Lipset, 
1959). In other words, the “more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy”. Following Barro 1999, Lipset 1959, Epstein et al. 2004, we introduce GDP per capita to 
control for economic development channel in democratic transitions. Epstein et al. (2004) argued 
that modernization predicts that GDP per capita is a consistent predictor of moves towards 
democracy, while Przeworski et al. (2000) would claim that it only helps current democracies remain 
democratic, but does not predict other movements up the democracy scale.  
Urbanization rate: we include the urbanization rate drawn from World Development Indicators, 
which enables us to test the hypothesis that concentrated people can meet easier and therefore 
influence incumbents (Barro, 1999; Lipset 1959, Harold, 1937). In the literature, the sign of this 
influence is not clear.  Indeed, an increase of urbanization makes it easier for people to meet and 
exchange but that makes it also easy for the incumbents to keep watching over and controlling any 
activity. Following Harold (1937) who argued that “organized democracy is the product of urban life”, 
Barro(1999) found urbanized people is more likely to be democratic.  
Labor force: According to Rosendorff(2001)’s theory, a decrease in the relative size of the 
workforce increases the likelihood of a decision by the ruling elite to negotiate a transition to 
democracy. Given that developing countries are characterized by a very young age structure, it is 
important to control for its role in democratic transitions. Indeed, not only young people are able to 
protest and therefore overthrow the government but also they can delay the transition by 
supporting the autocratic regimes.  
                                                          
1 Note that we transform civil liberties and political rights indices in order to facilitate reading. See in 
appendix for more details. 
2
 External debt on exports between 200 and 250% and debt service on exports between 20 and 25% 
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Population: In order to control for country size, we introduce the log of the level of population in 
the model, following Barro (1999); Epstein and al. (2004). The hypothesis is that places that are too 
large to be manageable are likely to have more pressure means on incumbents.  However, large 
places can be non-democratic because of associated costs to finance elections, to fight corruption, 
and so on (For instance, the China).  
All of these variables are introduced in logarithm terms.  
 
4- Stylized facts: The indebted countries have implemented great reforms, including both political 
and economic. 
The period 1985-2011 is marked by important governance change in developing countries. The 
following graph represents the mean of external debt/exports of 103 countries (our sample) in 1985, 
by reference to their experience about civil liberties and investment profile change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1: Mean of external debt/exports ratio in 1985 of countries experienced good governance 
change or not between 1985 and 2011 
Since 1980, extensive efforts have been directed at generating economic recovery. These efforts 
included not only freedom for people but also economic policy reform. Indeed, during the period 
1980s-2000s, many countries experienced their first multiparty elections or adoption of new 
constitution. For instance, Benin in 1991, Malawi in May 1994, Ghana in 1992, Republic of Congo in 
1992, Central African Republic in 1992, Burkina Faso in 1991, Burundi in 1993 and Angola in 1992 
adopted new constitution that authorized multiparty elections in their countries3. With an external 
debt/exports ratio of 263.90 for Benin, 369.68 for Malawi, 331.85 for Ghana, 242.66 for Republic of 
                                                          
3
 Freedom in the World Report 1998 
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Congo, 363.85 for Central African Republic, 306.18 for Burkina Faso, and 354.54 for Burundi in 1985, 
these countries were not solvent, the debt/export ratio was higher than 150%, the threshold used in 
the enhanced HPIC initiative. Their efforts to give power and freedom to people were necessary in 
order to mobilize citizens for debt reimbursement by encouraging them to tax compliance. Indeed, 
one strand of the literature emphasizes that higher legitimacy for political institutions leads to higher 
tax compliance (Torgler and Schneider 2007). Moreover, Tayler (2006) argues that legitimacy makes 
“people feel that they ought to defer to decisions and rules, following them voluntarily out of 
obligation”. Legitimacy could be described as belief or trust in the authorities, institutions, and social 
arrangements to be appropriate, proper, just and work for the common good. According to the 
political legitimacy theory, tax compliance is positively related to perceptions about the 
government’s trustworthiness (Tayler 2006; Kirchler and al. 2008, Fauvelle-Aymar 1999).   
Furthermore, there were fears that debt burden could spread to the global situation and become 
unbearable to these countries. So, most of them implemented compulsory policies (Structural 
Adjustment Programs) whose the aim is to send out positive signal to creditors and international 
financial community. Thus, many countries adopted or extended their investment code in order to 
promote and protect domestic and foreign direct investment. For example, Zambia’s reform agenda 
started in 1991 with policy shift from command to market based economy. The market based policy 
reform agenda was supported by enactment of laws that support and protect private enterprise. 
Moreover, between 1991 and 1995, Zambia adopted the following laws and acts: Income Tax Act in 
1991, Investment Act in 1991, Privatization Act in 1993, Export Development Act in 1994, Securities 
and Exchange Act in 1994, Banking and Financial Services Act in 1994, The Zambia Revenue Act in 
1994, and Companies Act in 1995 (Mwitwa, 2006). Such policy reform for investment is essential in 
alleviating huge debt burden. Indeed, with an external debt/export ratio of 517.19 in 1985, Zambia 
was not solvent and investment is essential in order to increase employment, reduce poverty, 
enhance economic growth and send out positive signal to international community. Uganda in 1991, 
Burundi in 1992, Congo in 1992, Ethiopia in 1992, Ghana in 1992, Colombia in 1991, Malawi in 1991, 
Ecuador in 1991, Nicaragua in 1991, Peru in 1991 and Paraguay in  1992 have also experienced 
adoption of investment code during the period of debt overhang4.  
 
 5- The identification strategy 
As argued by Epstein et al (2004), one of the problems bedeviling the transitions literature is the 
difficulty in determining the appropriate statistical technique for analysis. Indeed, many indicators of 
democracy or governance are by construction censored either on left or right; or in many case 
double censored. The latter is the regular and particularly in this paper. The dependent variable is by 
construction constrained and there are clustering of observations at the constraint. In this situation, 
the use of OLS on the complete sample or on the unclustered part is biased and inconsistent. To 
overcome the limitedness of the dependent variable, we use an estimation technique called tobit 
that explicitly takes into account that the dependent variable is constrained. The tobit model, also 
called a censored regression model, is designed to estimate linear relationships between variables 
                                                          
4 Source: World Investment Report 1992 and 1993, Annex Table 11 and Table 4 respectively, see in appendix 
for more information 
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when there is either left- or right-censoring in the dependent variable. It will give accurate estimates 
for processes in which data cannot be observed out of some predetermined range. More specifically, 
we assume:  
∗

=  + 	 
Where 
~(0, 
); ∗ is a latent variable that is observed for values comprised between the upper 
and the lower bounds of the interval.  
 = 
∗

 if  ≤ ∗

≤ ;	 = 		
∗

< ;	 = 		
∗

>  
Where  and  are the upper and lower bounds of the interval, respectively.  
One another problem we should address in this paper is endogeneity issue. Indeed, in the literature 
many authors have pointed that indebted countries are associated to poor governance (Addison and 
Rahman 2004; Easterly 1999). So, the estimates can suffer from reverse causality and therefore 
underestimate the standards errors. To face this issue, we lag by one year the external debt-to-
exports ratio. It is conceivable that external debt level at   − 1 affects governance at  but the 
reverse is unbelievable. Specifically, we estimate: 
 !"#, = $ +  !"#,%& + '(()*+,-,%. +	,/ +	0 +	1, 
Where  !"# refers to democratic indicator for country  in time	, '(()*+,- represents the 
external debt-to-exports ratio,  a set of other independent variables, 1 represent error terms. 
We include $  to control for unobserved time-invariant country-level characteristics that are 
potentially correlated with the propensity to experience democratic transitions and 0 to control for 
time-varying shocks that affect all developing countries. Following Barro (1999), we introduce 5-year 
lag of the dependent variable to take into account inertia about institutional variables. 
 
6- Results 
 a- Baseline results 
Table 1 presents the results of the estimation of tobit’s method. From the outset, it is worth noting 
that external debt affects differently according to our selected governance indicator. Indeed, we 
observe that the coefficient associated with Debtexport is positive and significant in column (5) and 
negative in columns (1)-(4) and (6).  
On the one hand, the positive sign associated to external debt means that indebted countries are 
more likely to improve investment profile than other ones. This result is consistent with the theory of 
political legitimacy according to which governments send positive signals in order to increase tax 
compliance (Tayler 2006; Kirchler and al. 2008; Fauvelle-Aymar 1999) necessary for debt 
reimbursement. For example, in column (5), if the level of external debt increases of 1%, the 
incumbents improve business climate related to investment by 15.8%. This situation can be 
explained by the necessity to carry out good reforms in order to take into account population 
demand or to give some positive signals to the donors, private domestic and foreign investors of a 
political willingness of business climate improvements. Furthermore, incumbents react positively to 
investment profile in order to maintain private sector confidence. Indeed, Haggard and Kaufman 
(1997) argued that the initial reactions of the private sector to economic decline typically focus on 
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changes in specific policies or government personnel. But if private sector actors lose confidence in 
the ability of the government to manage crises effectively, they can quickly recalculate the cost 
associated with democratization. They are particularly likely to do so when there are opportunities to 
ally with moderate oppositions. The defection of private sector groups substantially weakens the 
power of authoritarian incumbents. Not only can business groups play a direct organizational and 
financial role within the opposition, but the loss of confidence confronts the government with bleak 
prospects for future investment and growth. 
 
Table 1 : Baseline results 
 Dependent variable 
 CLiberties PolRights Corruption LawOrder InvestProfile Polity2 
5-year lag of dep. Var. 0.129*** 0.148*** 0.121*** 0.181*** 0.002 0.175*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.923) (0.000) 
Ldebtexport, t-1 -0.094*** -0.221*** -0.157*** -0.088** 0.158* -0.424** 
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.048) (0.081) (0.019) 
lgdppc 0.718*** 0.678*** -0.369** 0.864*** 3.741*** 1.265* 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) 
lurban 0.742*** 1.818*** 0.885** -0.398 -4.106*** 3.061*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.297) (0.000) (0.008) 
llaborforce -1.130** 0.468 0.657 -0.176 1.165 -8.46*** 
 (0.010) (0.563) (0.255) (0.756) (0.326) (0.002) 
lpopulation 0.051 -0.892 -1.930*** 2.966*** 7.613*** 0.5814 
 (0.881) (0.166) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.776) 
Constant  -8.739 -0.716 31.3073*** -51.803*** -138.83*** 6.12*** 
 (0.157) (0.951) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R² 0.528 0.404 0.353 0.426 0.239 0.245 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1681 1610 1216 1216 1216 1521 
Censored 91 284 84 81 81 74 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
However, be indebted has an unfavorable effect on civil liberties, political rights, law and order, 
corruption and democracy. Indeed, table 1 highlights that there are negative correlation between 
these variables and external debt (Column 1-4 and 6). For instance, an increase of 1% of external 
debt level in percentage of exports decreases the civil liberties indices’ of 9.4 per cent in point.  This 
unfavorable nature of the debt on reform can be explained by the associated costs to political 
governance. Indeed, we can hold up as an example, the remuneration of the representative elected, 
the organization of election, the functioning of justice, the maintenance and the respect of law, 
which are all costly. Thus, for an already indebted country, it must take more precaution in order to 
avoid an increase of the public debt. For instance, the Senegal’s parliamentarians have voted the 
suppression5 of the Senate by 19th September 2012 because the Senate turned out to be expensive 
                                                          
5
 The Senate had been implemented in 1999, and then abolished in 2001 and restored again in 2007.  
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for Senegal’s taxpayers and so that economized resources (Euros 12 million per year) will be used to 
support flood victims. Burkina Faso has experienced the same case in 2002 by abolishing the Senate 
and we can note the following constitutional law6:”The experience of bicameral parliaments reveals a 
heaviness administrative reason of slowness, plus functioning costs very high for the fragile 
economies of our States. In our country, the option taken to fight against poverty commands that we 
must take into account the question of costs while not losing sight of the need to extend the base of 
democratic debate”.  
One other explanation of the disadvantageous effect of external debt is that foreign currency debt 
may reduce a country’s ability to implement great reform of protection of human rights and so 
ensuring fair justice. For example, in January 2013, Zimbabwe’s finances minister declared that after 
paying wages, only $217 left in the State’s coffers7 while elections are planned in August 2013. Thus, 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) accepted to finance the elections8 whose the 
cost is $132 million. This case of financing can improve human rights in Zimbabwe, but because of 
external debt overhang which is estimated to be US$10 billion9, the country was not able to finance 
the elections.  
But, curiously we observe external debt level has favorable effect on economic governance indicator 
scale (see column 5, investment profile) and negative effect on political governance scale (see 
column 1-4 and 6). We assume the following hypothesis:  
• Investment has direct and immediate effect on the mobilization of domestic resources while 
political reforms’ effect depends on citizen’s willingness to pay tax. Citizens’ expectations are 
much diversified while the objective of investors is to maximize profits.  Thus, if government 
adopts sound policy on investment, investors react quickly in order to benefit from the situation, 
but if government takes political measures, it is not sure that citizens are reassured on the use of 
public resources, important determinant of tax compliance. As hypothesized by Lipset (1959), 
crisis of legitimacy occur during a transition to a new social structure, if all major groups do not 
secure access to the political system early in the transitional period, or at least as soon as they 
develop political demands.  
• Political governance reforms are costly than promotion of investment reform. Indeed, the 
decision to adopt new law depends on the capacity of the country to hold up the associated 
costs, like the functioning of justice related to the new law, and sometimes the new law takes 
long time to be effective. Lipset (1993) argued that efforts to institutionalize freedom in low 
income countries face severe difficulties inherent in the fact that new democratic rights 
encourage demands and actions that destabilize the economy (because of high costs).  
Moving on control variable, we observe that the coefficient associated to GDP per capita is significant 
and positively correlated to civil liberties, political rights, law and order; investment profile and 
polity2. This is consistent with theory according to which wealthy society is more likely to sustain 
democracy (Lipset, 1953; Epstein 2004). However, the results shed light that wealthy countries are 
                                                          
6
 N°001-2002/AN, 22th January 2002 
7
 http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20130131-plus-que-217-dollars-dans-caisses-zimbabwe 
8
 http://ewn.co.za/2013/05/28/African-neighbours-to-fund-Zimbabwe-elections---Mugabe 
9
 http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2013/10/13/us10-bn-external-debt-holding-zim-back/ 
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also corrupted.  As argued by Bardhan (1997), corruption is an ancient problem and has always been 
with us. Following with this assertion, both poor and wealthy countries are struck by corruption.  
The coefficient associated to urbanization rate is consistent with theory according to which urban 
population has ability to organize and is therefore difficult for a dictator to suppress (Harold 1937; 
Lipset 1953). However, in column (5) urbanization rate is negatively related to investment profile.   
Furthermore, we observe that labor force has negative and significant coefficient, so consistent with 
Rosendorff(2001)’s theory. According to this theory, a decrease in the relative size of the workforce 
increases the likelihood of a decision by the ruling elite to negotiate a transition to democracy.  
At last, the negative coefficient associated to population in column (3) mean that great places are 
more corrupted. Indeed, as corruption exists both at micro and macro level it may appear harder for 
the central authority to monitor and control all citizens if they are many (for example the China).  
 
b- Robustness 
To check the validity of our findings we undertake a number of robustness exercises.  
(i) Testing for additional controls on baseline specification 
We add further controls in the baseline specification in order to take into account other variables 
likely to affect democratic transitions. These additional controls are GDP growth rate “GDPgrowth”, 
investment rate “investment”, trade openness “openness”, the ratio of female to male primary 
enrollment “educInequality”, and international reserve “Reserve”. All the data are drawn from World 
Development Indicators, the World Bank. We present here the results with civil liberties as main 
dependent variable. The results hold for other governance indicators. 
In column (1), we control for a widely shared view among researchers according to which changes of 
governance are often provoked by shocks and economic crisis (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; 
Haggard and Kaufman, 1995, Huntington (1991)). However, we observe that the coefficient 
associated to economic growth is positive and significant, so meaning that economic shock is 
followed by democracy downward. Moreover, external debt remains unfavorable to civil liberties. 
In column (2) we include investment in percentage of GDP. Investment can enable government to 
meet some citizen’s needs and so delaying governance reform. If investment is small, that can lead 
the country in violence and get the government to undertake emergency governance reform. The 
results shed light that investment is positively correlated to civil liberties. Moreover, our main 
hypothesis about external debt remains valid.  
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Table 2 : Testing for additional controls on baseline specification 
                                                   Dependent variable : civil liberties index 
 Gdpgrowth Investment Openness EducInequality Reserve 
5-year lag of dep.va 0.125*** 0.110*** 0.133*** 0.203*** 0.131*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ldebtexport, t-1 -0.0818** -0.0898** -0.106*** -0.13*** -0.079** 
 (0.029) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.033) 
lgdppc 0.671*** 0.422*** 0.63*** 0.401* 0.73*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.060) (0.000) 
lurban 0.741*** 0.908*** 0.690*** 0.379* 0.71*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.066) (0.000) 
llaborforce -1.134*** -2.172*** -1.34*** -1.331** -1.19*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.003) (0.015) (0.005) 
lpopulation -0.023 0.467 -0.275 -0.997* -0.127 
 (0.951) (0.240) (0.481) (0.062) (0.741) 
Additional control 0.015*** 0.24*** 0.047* 0.199 -0.016 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.668) (0.548) (0.613) 
Constant  8.205 -4.653 1.891 -14.206 10.198 
 (0.223) (0.525) (0.792) (0.129) (0.132) 
Pseudo R² 0.534 0.5315 0.5294 0.614 0.5333 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1675 1593 1660 1536 1664 
Censored 90 83 91 64 85 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
Given that developing countries are exposed to world trade fluctuations, we include in column (3) 
the variable trade openness “Openness” defined as sum of imports and exports in percentage of GDP 
in order to control for its possible effect on governance. This idea is consistent with Huger and al. 
(1993) that highlighted that be exposed to fluctuations in world markets penalize the stabilization 
and legitimating of regimes. The results (column 3) shed light that even controlling for openness, 
external debt still affects negatively civil liberties.  
In column (4), we control for the ratio of female to male primary enrollment and international 
reserve, respectively. Following Barro (1999), the ratio of female to male primary enrollment is a 
relevant indicator of education system. Furthermore, this indicator measure inequality in education 
system, and can be used as income inequality indicator. The results highlight that debt penalizes 
freedom in developing countries, but the coefficient associated to ratio of female to male primary 
enrollment is not significant.  
In the last column, we control for international reserve, respectively. Indeed, controlling for 
international reserve allow us to test the idea according to which holding foreign currencies may 
create less pressure for democratization because incumbents can use them to meet citizens’ 
Etudes et Documents n° 08, CERDI, 2014 
 
17 
 
demands. However, the two variables are not significant while external debt still affects negatively 
civil liberties.  
 
(ii) Testing for alternative main independent variable 
Heretofore, we have used the level of external debt as main independent variable, but now we use a 
dummy variable that takes one if the country experienced external debt default and zero otherwise. 
The data come from Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)’s database. The results (table 3) show that external 
debt crisis affects negatively corruption, law and order; and investment profile. Except investment 
profile, this finding is consistent with table 1 when we used external debt in level.  
As for investment profile, the finding is curious. Why has external debt level positive effect on 
investment profile while external debt default has the opposite effect? In order to answer this 
question, we present in table A5 (see in appendix) the results of previous findings about investment 
profile in addition to a new column where we include interactive variable between external debt-to-
exports ratio and external debt default. Table 4 highlights that external debt level has positive effect 
on investment profile while debt default has the opposite effect. The indebted countries sign most of 
time treaties with creditors and so improving investment profile (profits repatriation, etc). While 
experiencing external debt default sends out negative signal of the country and therefore diminish its 
capacity to negotiate with other countries. Indeed, each country does not want to sign a partnership 
with one other risked country. Thus, the risked country either will have fewer partnerships with 
other countries or it will try to increase control on capital flows and therefore deteriorating 
investment profile. 
Furthermore, another alternative of main independent variable is debt-to-GDP. The results reported 
in table A4 (see in appendix) are consistent with those of table 1. 
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Table 3 : Testing for alternative main independent variable 
 Dependent variable  
 CLiberties PolRights Corruption LawOrder InvestmentPro  Polity2 
5-year lag of dep. Var. 0.157*** 0.2245*** 0.1339*** 0.1829*** 0.0773** 0.233*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) 
Debtcrisis, t-1 -0.0361 -0.0451 -0.1710** -0.271*** -0.704*** 0.451 
 (0.658) (0.747) (0.023) (0.001) (0.000) (0.152) 
lgdppc 0.737** 1.256*** 0.022 1.5011*** 3.808*** -4.21*** 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.929) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lurban 1.3038* 8.91*** -0.0677 -2.410*** -6.197*** 16.15*** 
 (0.092) (0.000) (0.933) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
llaborforce -1.736** -0.5414 0.304 -0.928 -1.763 -11.1*** 
 (0.026) (0.711) (0.673) (0.232) (0.235) (0.001) 
lpopulation 0.7356 1.747 -1.505** 2.875*** 2.647** 4.930* 
 (0.292) (0.186) (0.014) (0.000) (0.030) (0.093) 
Constant  -3.785 22.507 25.687** -43.72*** -37.055* -64.954 
 (0.768) (0.357) (0.010) (0.000) (0.074) 
 
(0.238) 
Pseudo R² 0.513 0.408 0.327 0.413 0.216 0.289 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 616 585 647 647 647 626 
Censored 31 107 61 61 61 42 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
 
(iii) Do HIPC initiative, IMF programs and openness dampen debt constraint on democratic 
transitions?  
HIPC initiative 
The Breton Woods institutions (World Bank and IMF) have launched in 1996 the HIPC initiative which 
has as objective to reduce the debt of some poor countries in order to promote economic growth 
and sound economic policy. This initiative was agreed by governments around the world, and 
represented an important step forward in placing debt relief within an overall framework of poverty 
reduction. According to IMF, to date, fixtures debt reduction under the HIPC initiative were approved 
for 36 countries, including 30 in Africa, providing relief from US $76 billion of debt service over the 
years. However, the decision to reduce or cancel the debt of a country is preceded by an assessment 
of the economic governance effectiveness. Indeed, upstream is the concept of good governance on 
compliance with human rights, the principles of law, the strengthening of democracy, the promotion 
of transparency and the proper functioning of the public administration. Furthermore, debt relief 
frees resource to finance activities related to good governance promotion and therefore the benefit 
is double: upstream the country must undertake sound policy and downstream the assistance gives 
more space for more activities.  
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In order to assess the effect of the HIPC initiative on democracy, we interact debt with a dummy 
variable that takes one if year after the implementation of the HIPC initiative (1996) and zero 
otherwise. On the whole, the results reported in table 5 show that the HIPC initiative has positive 
effect on democracy. Indeed, debt relief dampens budget constraints of indebted countries and so 
allows financing of good governance. 
Table 4: Testing for HIPC initiative effect on democratic transitions 
 Dependent Variable 
 CLiberties PolRights Corruption LawOrder InvestProfile Polity2 
5-year lag of dep. Var. 0.125*** 0.144*** 0.121*** 0.171*** 0.001 0.171*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.968) (0.000) 
Ldebtexport, t-1 -0.172*** -0.364*** -0.168*** -0.40*** 0.063 -0.717*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.553) (0.003) 
Debt*year1996 0.106*** 0.187** 0.017 0.473*** 0.145 0.403** 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.751) (0.000) (0.125) (0.028) 
lgdppc 0.760*** 0.713*** -0.361** 1.128*** 3.819*** -1.113* 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.084) 
lurban 0.668*** 1.720*** 0.883** -0.469 -4.132*** 2.710** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.038) (0.256) (0.000) (0.021) 
llaborforce -1.211*** -0.323 0.641 -0.623 1.031 -9.091*** 
 (0.004) (0.684) (0.245) (0.268) (0.381) (0.001) 
lpopulation 0.041 1.066 -1.943*** 2.613*** 7.512*** 0.124 
 (0.914) (0.141) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.951) 
Constant  6.533 -3.60 31.585*** -43.1*** -36.571*** 34.347 
 (0.342) (0.772) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.345) 
 
Pseudo R² 0.53 0.405 0.353 0.462 0.240 0.246 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1681 1610 1216 1216 1216 1521 
Censored 91 284 84 81 81 74 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
 
IMF programs 
In this section, we analysis the role of donors, particularly the International Monetary Fund. Indeed, 
Huntingtonn (1991) predicted that in the 1990s the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank could conceivably become much more forceful than they have heretofore been in 
making political democratization as well as economic liberalization a precondition for economic 
assistance (Huntingtonn 1991 :17). In spite of the fact that the IMF does not work exclusively on 
governance promotion, its interventions can play a great role in indebted countries. When the debt 
crisis has broken out in Mexico in 1982, the IMF has increased its interventions in debtor countries by 
coordinating a global response in order to eliminate the problem. It implemented the Structural 
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Adjustment Facility in 1986, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility in 1987, the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in 1996, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) in 2009. 
All of these programs aim to promote growth in poor countries by reforming sectors’ governance and 
cancelling debt of some countries. As argued by Brinkerhoff (2000), sectoral programs and policy 
reform can contribute to democratic governance by creating opportunities for participation, 
accountability, and transparency that advance the larger transformation process toward more 
democratic governance. Thus, we include interactive variable that control for the effect of IMF’s 
interventions. 
Table 5: Testing for IMF programs effect on democratic transitions 
 Dependent Variable  
 CLiberties PolRights Corruption LawOrder InvestPro Polity2 
5-year lag of dep. Var. 0.134*** 0.152*** 0.1203*** 0.178*** 0.0072 0.176*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.796) (0.000) 
Ldebtexport, t-1 -0.114*** -0.246*** -0.1546** -0.097** -0.1387 -0.5066*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.025) (0.150) (0.005) 
ldebt*imf 0.0285*** 0.035** -0.004 0.0159* 0.016 0.120*** 
 
imf 
 
Lgdppc 
 
Lurban 
 
Llaborforce 
 
Lpopulation 
 
(0.000) 
0.3266* 
(0.098) 
728*** 
(0.000) 
0.682*** 
(0.001) 
-1.1705*** 
(0.005) 
0.044 
(0.907) 
(0.015) 
0.145** 
(0.042) 
0.714*** 
(0.007) 
1.788*** 
(0.001) 
-0.427 
(0.594) 
0.9322 
(0.196) 
(0.589) 
0.412 
(0.156) 
-0.377** 
(0.027) 
0.932** 
(0.033) 
0.674 
(0.223) 
-1.907*** 
(0.000) 
(0.068) 
0.203* 
(0.062) 
0.874*** 
(0.000) 
-0.3648 
(0.423) 
-0.135 
(0.818) 
3.008*** 
(0.000) 
(0.338) 
0.0845 
(0.863) 
3.737*** 
(0.000) 
-4.109*** 
(0.000) 
1.168 
(0.327) 
7.592*** 
(0.000) 
(0.003) 
0.321* 
(0.073) 
-1.227* 
(0.057) 
2.794** 
(0.015) 
-9.064*** 
(0.001) 
0.2307 
(0.911) 
Constant  6.893 0.079 30.732*** 2.592*** -38.39*** 31.716** 
 (0.310) (0.995) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.393) 
Pseudo R² 0.529 0.405 0.351 0.426 0.238 0.2469 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Obs. 1664 1593 1200 1200 1200 1521 
Censored 91 284 84 81 81 74 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
The results reported in table 6 highlight that IMF programs dampen the negative effect of external 
debt on democracy. A part from the impact of sectoral program and policy reform shed light by 
Brinkerhoff (2000), IMF provided debt forgiveness grants or reduction (Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative) and therefore free resource to finance 
costs associated to democratic transition.  
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International financial integration 
Given that the ability of country to finance its policy is related to its ability to borrow in international 
market, we include an interactive variable in order to evaluate the effect of international financial 
integration and trade openness on democratic transition. We use a measure of international financial 
integration constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The variable is defined as follows: 
23245 =
(36 + 37)
45
 
Where 36(37) denotes the stock of external assets (liabilities).  
While financial integration can increase economic efficiency, it also creates greater uncertainty about 
citizens’ future income positions, against which they might plausibly seek insurance through the 
marketplace or through constitutionally arranged income redistribution. The availability of insurance 
mechanisms to citizens is key if political pressure for capital controls is to be averted and public 
support for a liberal international financial order is to be maintained (Dailami, 2000). Furthermore, 
be financially integrated can incite country to become more democratic if it wants to benefit from 
low interest rates.  
Table A6 (in appendix) show that integrated countries are more free (column 1) while they suffer of 
poor judicial system (column 4). The reason is that not only integrated countries can easily mobilize 
resource to finance civil liberties promotion but also they promote freedom in order to benefit from 
rating agency’s evaluations (S & P, Moody’s, and so on) and therefore low borrowing rates. The 
negative coefficient of financial integration on judicial system can be explained by the citizens’ fairs 
about loss of income and so they compel authority to increase capital controls. Thus, the judicial 
system may appear not impartial.   
 
(v) Dealing with endogeneity?  
In this part, we discuss about endogeneity. Up down to now, we have lagged debt in order to reduce 
endogeneity issue. While this assumption holds, one can argue that be indebted is related to political 
and economic governance. Indeed, according to Addison and Rahman (2004), the likelihood to 
become a HIPC is positively associated with poor governance. However, this assertion cannot be used 
to justify the debt of developed and democratic countries (United States of America, Japan, France, 
England, etc). Buchanan (1958) has demonstrated that the debt of developed countries is mainly due 
to the democratic values of these countries. This makes confusion in the debt explanation.   
Following Panizza and Presbitero (2012), we propose to address the endogeneity issue by 
instrumenting the debt-to-GDP ratio with the real effective exchange rate. Expressly, we consider a 
country that has issued external debt denominated in N currencies. Then, given that debt is 
expressed in foreign currency, so fluctuations of real effective exchange rate affect the level of debt. 
Furthermore, an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate reduces the debt ratio denominated 
in foreign currency.  
In order to use real exchange rate as an instrument, two conditions should be met: (a) real exchange 
rate needs to be relevant (i.e., it needs to be correlated with external debt) and (b) exogenous (i.e., it 
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should be uncorrelated with our governance indicator). Focusing first on relevance, it appears to be 
guaranteed by the fact that there is a mechanical relationship between the external debt-to-GDP 
ratio and the real effective exchange rate. Furthermore, our main variable is defined in foreign 
currency and therefore likely to be highly correlated to real effective exchange rate. Given that our 
sample is made up of developing countries, using the real exchange rate is relevant because these 
countries are more likely to experience currency issue than developed countries.  
With respect to exogeneity, as we estimate two-step tobit with endogenous regressor (external 
debt), we will test the null hypothesis of exogeneity by using Wald test. Prior to this test, we do not 
believe that real exchange rate has direct effect on our selected dependent variables (i.e civil 
liberties, political rights, corruption, polity2, investment profile, law and order) . However, we include 
GDP growth in our regression in order to take into account the expected effect of real exchange rate 
on economic growth. Indeed, Rodrik (2008) shows that the real exchange rate is an important driver 
of economic growth and that undervalued exchange rates are associated with higher economic 
growth. Thus, controlling for the GDP growth will eliminate direct or indirect effect of real exchange 
rate on democracy. In order words, we are confident about the validity of the exogeneity of our 
instrument.  
We turn now to data and results. The data of real effective exchange rate are drawn from World 
Development Indicators, the World Bank. Real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective 
exchange rate (a measure of the value of a currency against a weighted average of several foreign 
currencies) divided by a price deflator or index of costs. The results are presented in table 9. 
At the bottom of the table is a Wald test of the exogeneity of the instrumented variables (external 
debt). If the test statistic is not significant, there is not sufficient information in the sample to reject 
the null that there is no endogeneity. Then a regular tobit regression may be appropriate; the point 
estimates from two-step tobit are consistent except in column (2), though those from tobit are likely 
to have smaller standard errors. Our instrumented variable is endogenous and therefore confirms 
the use of two-step estimator. Furthermore, we observe that the real effective exchange rate is 
strongly significant and negatively associated to external; an appreciation of the national currency 
reduces the debt in foreign currency.  
On the whole, two-step tobit and tobit are similar about the sign associated to external debt. On the 
one hand, external debt prevents indebted countries to promote good political governance because 
of associated costs to political reforms. On the other hand, indebted countries are more likely to 
improve investment profile and therefore confirm the theory of political legitimacy according to 
which governments send positive signals in order to increase tax compliance by improving business 
climate related to investment.  
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Table 6: robustness: dealing with endogeneity 
 Second stage: Dependent Variable 
 CLiberties Corruption Law InvestProfile Polity2 
5-year lag of dep. Var. 0.218*** 0.184*** 0.225*** -0.071 0.404*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.217 (0.000) 
ldebtgdp -0.517* -0.371** -0.445** 2.801*** -4.959** 
 (0.055) (0.024) (0.019) (0.001) (0.015) 
lgdppc 1.062*** -1.701*** 0.666** 4.613*** 1.310 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.344) 
lurban 1.513*** 2.320** -2.304** -16.22*** -0.653 
 (0.003) (0.039) (0.038) (0.000) (0.868) 
llaborforce -0.122 -2.431** -1.212 -2.020 -13.372** 
 (0.894) (0.010) (0.190) (0.436) (0.021) 
lpopulation 0.345 -3.826*** 2.880** 16.608*** 18.903*** 
 (0.628) (0.002) (0.013) (0.000) (0.002) 
Gdpgrowth 0.029*** 0.011** 0.091* 0.0102 0.110*** 
 (0.000) (0.042) (0.079) (0.522) (0.001) 
Constant 11.834 78.771*** -36.784** -31.021*** -66.07** 
 (0.304) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.010) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 787 608 608 608 742 
Censored 69 51 51 51 43 
 First stage for Debtgdp  
lrer -0.486*** -0.419*** -0.435*** -0.401*** -0.372*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
5-year lag of dep. Var. -0.058*** -0.078*** -0.088*** 0.026** -0.024*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) 
lgdppc -0.069 -0.682*** -0.504*** -0.697*** -0.337*** 
 (0.566) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
lurban 0.357 2.918*** 3.052*** 3.376*** 1.040*** 
 (0.246) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
llaborforce 1.533*** 0.811 0.857 0.937 0.868 
 (0.005) (0.168) (0.143) (0.113) (0.158) 
lpopulation -2.026*** -3.853*** -3.650*** -3.889*** -2.622*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gdpgrowth -0.033** 0.024 0.0068 0.0257 -0.001 
 (0.036) (0.508) (0.850) (0.488) (0.959) 
Constant 31.329*** 57.65*** 52.343*** 55.525 43.510*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj R-squared 0.699 0.7966 0.7987 0.7947 0.7359 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-Value for Wald test of exogeneity 0.0745 0.9189 0.0474 0 0 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value; ***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, 
significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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7- Conclusion and Recommendations 
The analysis of this paper has shown that external debt constraints indebted countries to move up 
democracy scale but incite governments to improve investment profile and therefore improving 
business climate. The negative coefficient associated to political governance is mainly due to 
associated costs to political affairs like the organization of election, the functioning of justice, the 
maintenance and the respect of law, which are all costly. This finding is against-swing by the 
experience about investment arrangements whose incumbents are more likely to undertake sound 
policy during debt burden in order to (i) improve business climate environment and send out positive 
signal to international financial community, (ii) to collectivize the debt and incite taxpayers for its 
reimbursement (political legitimacy theory).  
Given the overwhelming importance of good governance for economic development, we suggest the 
following recommendations: 
(i) As argued by Jaime De Melo (2010):”the Official Development Assistance, initially granted for 
projects, has been run towers economic and good governance reforms”. To that end, the 
international financial community must increase their assistance aiming to promote good 
governance. Moreover, because the indebted countries are facing high costs related to political 
governance, the international community should implement “World Wide Fund for Governance” in 
order to support the indebted countries and protecting political rights and civil liberties around the 
world.  
(ii) Given that HIPC initiative and IMF programs dampen external debt effect on democratic 
transitions, we call for an increase of debt relief intended for developing countries. This will relax 
debt constraint on democracy promotion while improving the quality of public finance and therefore 
fighting against poverty.  
(iii) In view of our results about investment profile, developing countries should continue to 
undertake sound policy reforms and do not relaxing because of “generosity” of international financial 
community. Indeed, investment is essential in order to increase employment, reduce poverty, 
enhance economic growth and send out positive signal to investors and international community. 
The analysis in this paper would be completed by further investigation about the relation of debt to 
democracy by focusing on what happens to democracy when a country is not able to finance its own 
policies. This kind of study can also try to estimate necessary funds to mobilize in order to promote 
good governance in developing countries.   
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APPENDIX 
(a)- Descriptive statistics 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
debtexport 2305 308.718 442.1399 4.584606 4223.91 
debtcrisis 858 0.3344988 0.4720902 0 1 
PolRights 2642 4.145344 1.9787 1 7 
CLiberties 2642 4.10106 1.593486 1 7 
corruption 1772 2.498001 1.021318 0 6 
law 1772 2.873989 1.117381 0 5 
investProfile 1772 6.383489 2.160196 0 11.5 
polity2 2261 1.494471 6.380528 -10 10 
gdppc 2553 3744.251 3508.231 101.5976 22866.96 
urban 2754 41.19307 20.11393 5.057 93.5048 
laborforce 2178 67.90969 10.52372 41 91.5 
population 2754 4.21E+07 1.58E+08 67400 1.34E+09 
gdpgrowth 2589 3.857491 6.07401 -51.03086 106.2798 
investment 2462 21.93173 9.491048 -2.424358 152.7291 
Unemployment 946 8.646787 6.041622 0.1 59.5 
reserve 2532 1.26E+10 1.18E+11 -628535.5 3.25E+12 
trade openness 2577 75.46927 39.00129 10.83072 280.361 
imf programs 2703 0.4520903 0.4977915 0 1 
rer 1133 4539.245 129910.4 19.52734 4342820 
integration 2617 1.639167 3.078505 0.046 77.1 
mortality 2781 59.07875 35.90666 6.8 165.5 
EducInequality 1579 90.25955 15.95411 0 131.245 
hipc 2781 0.3786408 0.4851356 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Etudes et Documents n° 08, CERDI, 2014 
 
30 
 
(b) Sample 
Table A2: Sample 
Country’s name 
Afghanistan Grenada Philippines 
Angola Guatemala Papua New Guinea 
Argentina Guyana Paraguay 
Burundi Honduras Rwanda 
Benin Haiti Senegal 
Burkina Faso Indonesia Solomon Islands 
Bangladesh India Sierra Leone 
Belize Iran El Salvador 
Bolivia Jamaica Somalia 
Brazil Jordan Sao Tomé and Principe 
Bhutan Kazakhstan Swaziland 
Botswana Kenya Seychelles 
Central African Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Syrian Arab Republic 
Chile Cambodia Chad 
China Lao PDR Togo 
Côte d’Ivoire Lebanon Thailand 
Cameroon Liberia Tajikistan 
Congo Lesotho Tonga 
Colombia Madagascar Turkey 
Comoros Maldives Tanzania 
Cape Verde Mexico Uganda 
Costa Rica Mali Uruguay 
Djibouti Mongolia Uzbekistan 
Dominica Mozambique St. Vincent and the Grenadine 
Dominican Republic Mauritania Venezuela 
Ecuador Mauritius Vietnam 
Eritrea Malawi Vanuatu 
Ethiopia Malaysia Samoa 
Fiji Niger Yemen 
Gabon Nigeria South Africa 
Ghana Nicaragua Dem. Rep. Congo 
Guinea Nepal Zambia 
The Gambia Pakistan Zimbabwe 
Guinea-Bissau Panama Peru 
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(c) Data description 
-Political Rights “PolRights” of Freedom House: the ratings are based on an evaluation of three 
subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of 
government. Political rights refer, for example, to the existence and the equity of elections, the 
existence of the opposition and the possibility to take the power through elections. Like civil liberties, 
each country is assigned to a numerical rating from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the most free and 7 
the least free. 
-Corruption: This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. Such corruption is a 
threat to domestic and foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the economic and financial 
environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume 
positions of power through patronage rather than ability; and, last but not least, introduces an 
inherent instability into the political process. This variable is rated from 0 to 6, with 0 representing 
very high risk of corruption.  
-Law and Order “LawOrder” form a single component, but its two elements are assessed separately, 
with each element being scored from zero to three points. To assess the “Law” element, the strength 
and impartiality of the legal system are considered, while the “Order” element is an assessment of 
popular observance of the law. Each country is assigned to numerical rating from 0 to 6, with 6 
representing very low risk of law and order.  
-Investment Profile “InvestProfile”: This is an assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment 
that are not covered by other political, economic and financial risk components. The risk rating 
assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation, 
and payment delays. The variable is rated from 0 to 12, high values mean very low risk of investment.  
Law and Order, Corruption and Investment Profile are drawn from International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) database, 2013.  
-Polity 2: we use the Polity2 Index, which is a revised combined polity score ranging from -10 to +10 
where higher values indicate a higher level of democracy and political freedom. The data are drawn 
from the Polity4 Project (Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) 2013). 
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(d) robustness: testing for lag of debt-to-exports ratio 
Table A3:  robustness: testing for lag of debt-to-exports ratio 
 Dependent variable 
Cliberties PolRights Corruption LawOrder InvestProfile Polity2 
5-year lag of dep. Var. 0.131*** 0.150*** 0.112*** 0.180*** 0.0106 0.182*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.697) (0.000) 
Ldebtexports, t-2 -0.046** 0.086 -0.140*** -0.018 0.1008* -0.072* 
 (0.041) (0.21) (0.003) (0.696) (0.098) (0.073) 
lgdppc 0.766*** 0.832*** 0.394** 0.932*** 3.631*** -0.749 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.264) 
lurban 0.749*** 1.916*** 1.002** -0.372 -3.986*** 3.023** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.331) (0.000) (0.008) 
llaborforce -1.138** -0.541 0.545 -0.150 0.875 -8.279*** 
 (0.010) (0.505) (0.345) (0.792) (0.463) (0.002) 
lpopulation -0.24 0.286 1.755*** 3.354*** 7.430*** 2.051 
 (0.478) (0.653) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.262) 
Constant 12.48** 13.459 28.648*** -58.14*** -33.965*** -7.864 
 (0.042) 
 
(0.240) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.814) 
Pseudo-R² 0.5253 0.402 0.353 0.424 0.2396 0.244 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1683 1610 1211 1211 1211 1526 
Censored 89 285 84 81 51 74 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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(e) Testing for alternative main independent variable: Debt-to-GDP 
Table A4: Testing for alternative main independent variable: Debt-to-GDP 
 Dependent variable 
 Cliberties PolRights Corruption LawOrder InvestProfile Polity2 
5-year lag of dep. Var.  0.165*** 0.158*** 0.097*** 0.208*** 0.014 0.181*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.596) (0.000) 
Ldebtgdp, t-1 -0.046* -0.055 -0.307*** -0.098** 0.064** -0.226** 
 (0.072) (0.144) (0.000) (0.027) (0.049) (0.025) 
lgdppc 0.773*** 0.755*** -0.629*** 0.617*** 2.855*** -0.471 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.441) 
lurban 0.840*** 1.841*** 1.163*** -0.696* -3.271*** 4.063*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.064) (0.000) (0.001) 
llaborforce 0.7153 1.602* -0.106 -0.218) 2.561** -4.041 
 (0.127) (0.069) (0.851) (0.686) (0.028) (0.155) 
lpopulation 0.166 0.251 -2.269*** 2.349*** 6.690*** 2.232 
 (0.592) (0.666) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.236) 
Constant -8.547 -20.699** 41.526*** -37.38*** -25.94*** -34.932 
 (0.129) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.328) 
 
Pseudo-R² 0.5339 0.4158 0.3573 0.444 0.243 0.2537 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1824 1749 1268 1268 1268 1628 
Censored 133 363 98 98 98 100 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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(f) Investment profile, external debt level and debt default 
Table A5: investment profile, external debt level and debt default 
 Dependent variable: investment Profile 
 
5-year lag of dep. Var. 
 
0.002 
 
0.0773** 
 
0.044 
 (-0.923) (-0.043) (0.299) 
Ldebtexport, t-1 0.158*  0.303** 
 (0.093)  (0.046) 
Crisis, t-1  -0.704***  
  (0.000)  
Debt*Crisis, t-1  -0.135*** 
   (0.000) 
lgdppc 3.741*** 3.808*** 4.409*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lurban -4.106*** -6.197*** -6.968*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
llaborforce 1.165 -1.763* -1.848** 
 (-0.326) (-0.053) (0.021) 
lpopulation 7.613*** 2.647** 4.962*** 
 (0.000) (-0.030) (0.003) 
Constant -38.83*** -37.055* -77.481*** 
 (0.000) (-0.074) (0.005) 
Pseudo R² 0.239 0.216 0.21 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1216 647 617 
Censored 81 51 50 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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(g) Testing for openness effect on democratic transitions 
Table A6: Testing for financial integration effect on democratic transitions 
 Dependent variable 
 CLiberties PolRights Corruption Law InvestProfile Polity2 
5-year lag of dep. Var.  0.136*** 0.147*** 0.111*** 0.183*** 0.005 0.181 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.855) (0.000) 
Ldebtexports, t-1 -0.155*** -0.182** -0.094* 0.043 0.388*** -0.468** 
 (0.001) (0.018) (0.056) (0.450) (0.001) (0.035) 
debt*integration 0.092*** 0.0039 0.259*** -0.127*** -0.160** 0.261* 
 (0.000) (0.940) (0.000) (0.001) (0.041) (0.074) 
lintegration -0.406*** 0.087 -1.701*** 0.443** 0.403 -1.474* 
 (0.000) (0.742) (0.000) (0.046) (0.385) (0.09) 
lgdppc 0.664*** 0.724*** -0.285* 0.986*** 3.918*** -1.233* 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.085) (0.000) (0.000) (0.063) 
lurban 0.659*** 1.819*** 0.770 -0.341 -4.005*** 3.031*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.067) (0.437) (0.000) (0.009) 
llaborforce -1.101** -0.473 0.646 -0.302 0.726 -8.244*** 
 (0.010) (0.555) (0.257) (0.616) (0.540) (0.002) 
lpopulation 0.106 0.957 -2.320*** 3.002*** 7.458*** 0.409 
 (0.782) (0.192) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.841) 
Constant 5.263 0.215 37.292*** -52.579 -37.176*** 24.454 
 (0.439) (0.986) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.503) 
Pseudo-R² 0.5315 0.4044 0.3737 0.435 0.2431 0.2458 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1679 1608 1214 1214 1214 1519 
Censored 91 284 84 81 81 74 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
